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Introduction
This is a conceptual paper that presents a comparative analysis of three Fibre-to-the–
Home (FTTH) markets in the EU. These markets are namely Denmark, Sweden and the 
Netherlands. The study had a dual aim. The first aim was to understand the challenges 
in the FTTH markets in these countries. The second aim was to identify solution(s) that 
may support the liberalization of the FTTH market in the EU. The emphasis of this paper 
is on the FTTH market, though the Fiber-to-the Building (FTTB) is mentioned when 
discussing the problems in the FTTH market. Different technologies have been adopted 
to achieve the EU vision 2020 agenda. This is a digital agenda for attaining Universal 
Access of Next Generation Access (NGA) of at least 30 MBs by 2020. These NGA 
technologies include FTTH, cable networks (DOCSIS 3.x), Very-high-bit-rate Digital 
Subscriber Line (VDSL) among others (see Marcus et al., 2009; Falch et al., 2016). 
Though these NGAs can be used to achieve the EU 2020 agenda, FTTH is the technology 
that has the capacity to deliver greater bandwidth and data rates – compared to the others. 
Yet the deployment of this technology is capital intensive. 
* Dr. Idongesit Williams, CMI, Aalborg University, e-mail: Idong@cmi.aau.dk
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The EU promotes the adoption of competitive markets to deliver telecommunication 
infrastructure. To facilitate such competition, EU member countries have liberalized 
their telecommunication market. The liberalization of the market has resulted in 
encouragement of innovation in the delivery of Internet networks and services in the EU 
(Pelkams, Renda, 2011). However, from 2008 till now, the deployment of FTTH in the 
EU has been slow. The countries with the highest penetration of FTTH and FTTB in the 
EU are Lithuania and Sweden. However, their national FTTH and FTTB penetration are 
below 40%. In 2015 Lithuania and Sweden recorded 34% and 33% FTTB connections 
respectively, while Norway and Portugal recorded 23% and 18.5% FTTH connections 
respectively (FttH Council Europe, 2015).
To aid the development of FTTH infrastructure, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
has also been utilized to deal with the capital intensive nature of deploying FTTH (EPEC, 
2012; Bourreau et al., 2012). However in markets where PPPs are adopted, the adoption 
by end-subscribers of FTTH is slow. This can also be seen in cases where supply outstrips 
demand. The low penetration and slow adoption of FTTH presents a dilemma that is 
worth investigating – hence the aim of this paper. 
To conduct this research, an exploratory research approach was adopted. Data on the 
rate of penetration of FTTH from EU member countries and the challenges identified in 
the FTTH market were gathered from secondary data sources. These sources include 
documentation from the EU Commission, documentation from telecom regulatory 
bodies of Denmark, Sweden and Netherlands and previous research into the FTTH 
markets in Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands. There were follow up interviews with 
Danish telecom experts to verify the findings. The concept of the Obligatory Passage 
Point (OPP) from the Actor Network Theory was used to identify what national policy 
makers expected from their FTTH market actors. This becomes a yardstick to verify, if 
some of the market actors fulfilled their roles and what was the market outcome. 
The OPPs in this papers are proposed policies and initiatives. The SWOT analysis is used 
to put the identified outcome in perspective in order to compare the three markets. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the rationale for choosing 
the case. Section 3 presents the literature review on liberalization and FTTH infrastructure 
development in the EU. Section 4 presents the theoretical approach adopted in the paper. 
Section 5 outlines the methodology used in the paper. Section 6 outlines the findings and 
presents the analysis of the findings. This is followed by the discussion section in 
section 7 and the conclusions in section 8.
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Rationale for choosing the three countries
Sweden: Sweden was chosen because it has the second highest FTTB penetration in 
the EU – even though the FTTH connectivity is lower that the FTTB connectivity as 
mentioned earlier. Sweden was also worth studying because of the impact of regulatory 
initiatives that did influence the emergence of a competitive market and a positive 
outcome towards FTTB penetration (Godlovitch et al., 2015). 
Denmark: Denmark was chosen because it is one of the most liberalized markets in 
the EU. The paradox however, FTTH penetration is low. Its FTTH and FTTB penetration 
in 2015 were 14% and 15% respectively (FttH Council Europe, 2015). However, other 
Fixed-Broadband market seem to be thriving in Denmark. Fixed-Broadband penetration 
in Denmark, as an example, is reported to be 90% (EU, 2015). This anomalous outcome 
for FTTH produced curiosity towards understanding how the liberalization policy in 
Denmark actually affects the FTTH market.
Netherlands: The Netherlands was chosen because its approach to facilitating FTTH 
is almost similar to the Swedish approach – as will be seen in the report. The Dutch, just 
like the Danes, have one of the highest Broadband penetration rates in the world (De Bijl, 
2011). But their FTTH penetration was a little above 11% in 2015 (FttH Council Europe, 
2015). If they adopt the Swedish approach, why do they not have the same results? Or do 
they have similar problems to Denmark? These made the case of the Netherlands worth 
investigating in light with the overall research question of this paper.
Some markets where FTTH is adopted in the EU have similar characteristics. Hence 
the scenarios presented by these three cases present the possibility of identifying some 
of the challenges affecting the low penetration of FTTH in the EU. The challenges 
identified here may lead to pointers that could enable the recommendation of policy 
solutions that could lead to a greater penetration of FTTH in the EU.
Liberalization and the facilitation of FTTH in the EU
Telecom market liberlization in the EU has been shaped by different EU green 
papers, directives, recommendations and legislations (OECD, 1998; Cave, 2009; 
Hultkrantz, 2002). These initiatives were – among others – aimed at:
1. The facilitation of regionally converged telecommunications market (Kaiser, 
2001).
2. The facilitation of market competition aimed at achiving Universal service of 
basic services (Mayer-Schonberger, Strasser, 1999).
3. Preventing the emergence of network operators with market power in each 
member state (ITU, 2002; Cave, 2009).
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In the EU and globally, competititive markets have been facilitated via the reduction 
of market entry barriers, the imposition of Universal Service Obligations (USO), the 
control of the retail and access prices, and structural seperation of P&Ts (Blackman, 
Srivastava, 2011; Cave, 2009; Christopoulos et al., 2009). The intervention in retail prices 
was necessary to ensure the affordability of the service for the subscriber. The intervention 
in access prices was to ensure transparency and non-discriminatory practices with 
respect to interconnection and Service Level Agreements (SLA) between the players in 
the wholesale and retail markets.
The descision to liberalize the telecommunication markets in the EU differs from 
country to country. How and which part of the market was liberlized differed as well. For 
example, before the EU legislation of 1998, certain member states had liberlized the 
terminal equipments market. The Netherlands did liberalize their terminal equipment 
and value added services market in 1998 (OECD, 1998). The Swedish and Danish 
govenments liberlized similar markets in the early 1980s (Hultkrantz, 2002; ITU, 2002). 
Other EU countries addopted different approaches at different times. Though the 
approach of these member states towards telecom market liberlization differed, the basic 
idea of removing market restrictions to enhance competition in various spheres of the 
telecoms market was the same. 
The early results of the EU legislation of 1998 were:
1. The attainment of some form of regulatory convergence aimed at facilitating open 
markets in the EU (Kaiser, 2001). Member states used the EU legislation as 
inspiration towards developing their telecommunication markets. However, the 
differences in regulation in each member state was evident the regulation of 
competition at the local access networks (Kaiser, 2001; De Bijl, 2011). 
2. The success in transforming hitherto monopolistic markets into competitive 
markets. This is a success attributed to the early stages of telecom market 
liberlization in the EU that promoted facility based competition (Mayer-
Schonberger, Strasser, 1999). From the European Commission’s (EC) perspective, 
this success was as a result of a meticulously designed inter-institutional processes 
(EC, 2001; Mayer-Schonberger, Strasser, 1999). 
3. Tarrif and price reduction, delivery of new services and techology (Pelkams, 
Renda, 2011).
Based on these successes among others, the EU has extended the liberlization policy 
to the facilitation of NGA networks (Marcus et al., 2009). Competition in the FTTH 
market – in EU member states – is being facilitated by regulating access or unbundling. 
These forms of unbundling are facilitated at the active and retail layers using different 
open access initiatives (See Sadowski et al., 2009; Forzati, 2015; Van Gorp, Middleton, 
2010). Such initiatives are prevalent in the UK, Sweden and in the Netherlands (Godlovitch 
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et al., 2015). Competition at the passive layer is facilitated via infrastructure sharing 
frameworks, in-building wiring sharing and access to ducts (Godlovitch et al., 2015). 
These initiatives can be found in France among others. These access regulation initiatives 
have produced a competitive FTTH market at the passive, active and retail levels. One 
can therefore say that the regulation of competition has played a significant role in the 
development of the FTTH market in the EU. Such competition can be found the case of 
Denmark and many other EU member states (Falch et al., 2016).
The limitation of promoting a competitive market is the challenge of attaining 
Universal Access for a telecom or Internet technologies within a jurisdiction. This is 
because rural areas are not commercially viable, hence market players have no incentive 
to invest there. Bearing in mind the capital intensive nature of developing NGA networks, 
it is logical to assume that a competitive market will not result in the Universal Access of 
NGA networks. This presents a challenge towards the attainment of the EU’s digital 
agenda by 2020. Therefore the EU has adopted means of facilitating markets in 
commercially unviable areas. This is by providing the opportunity for public sector 
interventions in areas where there are market failures (Marcus et al., 2009). However, the 
caveat for this developemental approach by the EU is that such interventions should be 
aimed at facilitating the market (Williams, 2015). 
Different EU member states have adopted different approaches to facilitate the 
market in such areas. This includes the provision of subsidy by the public sector to aid 
the development of the passive and active FTTH infrastructure. Examples of such 
initiatives can be seen in Sweden (Williams, 2015). This is contrary to another approach 
adopted in the Netherlands, where the passive infrastructure is provided by the private 
sector (Van Gorp, Middleton, 2010). In other cases, EU subsidies, sometimes coupled 
with subsidies from municipalities, are provided to FTTH market players to facilitate 
competition at the active and passive layer (Sadowski et al., 2009).
There are other cases where complex arrangements are forged to finance FTTH 
infrastructure and service delivery in the EU. In such cases regions and municipalities in 
EU member states engage in Public Private Partnership (PPP) frameworks aimed at 
facilitating the FTTH infrastructure. The role of the regional and municipal entities 
could either be coordinating, infrastructure ownership or in providing financial capital 
to PPP arrangements. The regions and municipal entities facilitate the market by 
providing either the passive and/or active FTTH infrastruture. In some cases, they 
procure the services to be delivered via the infrastructure (Williams, 2015). An example 
of public intervention via PPP is the MetroWeb project in Milan, Italy (EPEC, 2012). This 
project was necessary because of the lack of incumbent (Telecom Italia) activity in the 
Area (EPEC, 2012). Hence there was a market failure. According to EPEC (2012), in 
1998, a utility company A2A* went into partnership with a telecoms company e.Biscom 
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to facilitate a 2,700 km Metropolitan Access Network in the Milan municipality. They 
collaborated with the municipality to develop a passive fiber infrastructure. This 
infrastructure was then leased to players at the active network layer. The municipality 
had no financial obligations in the partnership. Their interest in the project was to 
cordinate it and provide an enabling environment to enable the project’s success – as they 
were partners in the project. However, in the cases studied in this paper, the municipality 
had financial obligations to the PPP.
Despite the effort of the EU and EU member countries to liberlize the telecommu-
nications market, as mentioned earlier, some markets have enjoyed more coverage than 
others. In the EU’s FTTH market there is greater competition at the retail than the 
wholesale market. This is because there are greater efforts to regulate competition in the 
retail than the wholesale market. If there are many players in the wholesale market, then 
there is greater competition at the wholesale market. If there is lesser competition at the 
wholesale market, then active layer network operators have fewer options to peer with. 
This will affect the price the end user has to pay for the service. And these are services 
that other NGA networks and 4G networks can now deliver. The position of this paper 
based on the findings is that there should be greater effort in further liberalizing the 
wholesale market. This may enable FTTH to become attractive and competitive to other 
NGA networks and Broadband networks – thereby encouraging the greater penetration 
of FTTH in the EU.
Actor Network Theory
This was a theory popularized by Bruno Latour, Michael Callon, and John Law 
among others (Latour, 1996; Callon, 1986; Law, 1992). It is a sociological theory. 
The actor network or the sociology of translation is a theory that explains the process of 
the emergence and activities identified in socio-technical phenomena (Crawford, 2004). 
It is a descriptive as well as an explanatory theory. Actor networks are heterogeneous. Its 
structure evolves continuously as the interest and power relations between the actors 
evolve. The network in the context of the theory implies a network of actors (Latour, 
1996). The theory does not possess a universal framework and it is anti-epistemological. 
Despite this disadvantage, proponents of the theory, such as Michael Callon, John Law 
and Bruno Latour have adopted various descriptive techniques towards analyzing actor 
networks (Callon, 1986; Law, 1992; Latour, 2005).
In this paper, the Actor Network theory is not operationalized as a whole. This is 
because the purpose of the paper is not to make a socio-technical analysis. Rather 
a concept of the actor network theory presents an avenue by which the markets in the EU 
countries can be studied. This concept is called the Obligatory Passage Point (OPP). This 
 Idongesit Williams 
Comparative analysis of Fiber-to-the-Home market liberalization in the EU: The case of Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands
95
L
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
is a concept promoted by Micheal Callon (Callon, 1986). The OPP is the pathway 
developed by the focal actor on how to solve a problem, the actors needed to solve the 
problem and the role of each actor towards solving the problem. This concept is part of 
what Callon calls problematization. In his study of the domestication of scallops and 
fishermen at the Saint-Brieuc Bay, he identified four events that result in the formation 
of actor networks (Callon, 1986). These events include problematization, interessement, 
enrolment and mobilization. At the problematization stage, the focal actor defines the 
problem and develops a solution to the problem in a way that will be of interest to other 
actors. The second phase is the Interesement phase. This involves the focal actor 
negotiating with the supporting actors to accept their role in the network. The third phase 
is the enrolment stage. This involves the focal actor negotiating partnerships and 
synergies in the network to enable the proposed solution identified in the problematization 
phase to take effect. The final stage is the mobilization stage. Here the focal actor forges 
alliances with allied representatives of the network.
However, tracing these events is not of relevance to the paper, even though it can be 
applied. But the OPP is relevant. The OPP provides an insight into the vision of the focal 
actor. In this paper this is the vision of the public sector for the FTTH market. Such 
visions and action plans are enshrined in national policies or outlined in the development 
of initiatives – such as PPPs – identified in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands. 
Armed with these OPPs, it is possible to identify the action plan, identify the course of 
action and examine them alongside with the outcome of the FTTH. Here, one can identify 
the challenges in facilitating the action plan. One can also compare the market outcomes 
of each action plan (OPPs) using the SWOT analysis.
Michael Callon’s sociology of translation has been used in the study of Internet 
policies and markets. It has been used to explain the political economy of convergence 
(Shin, Venkatesh, 2008). It has also been used to analyze the development of 4th generation 
mobile network in China (Shin, 2015). It has also been used to analyze PPP frameworks 
suitable for developing rural Broadband networks (Williams, 2015). The use of the OPP 
as a means of evaluating a market outcome may be a novelty.
Methodology
The philosophical approach adopted in this paper is Interpretivism. Interpretivism 
helps the researcher to present their view on the development of FTTH market from 
a regulatory and development point of view. The study is qualitative. It is a multi-case 
study and an exploratory research. Three cases are chosen for the exploration. These are 
the Danish, Swedish and Dutch FTTH markets. Most data used for this sources is from 
secondary sources. These sources include EC, OECD, ITU, the national Regulator of 
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each country, Google scholar portals and previous empirical research conducted by the 
researcher. The search involved, searching for various liberalization policies, the telecom 
regulatory history of each country, market penetration and subscription figures and 
professional and academic insights into how the FTTH market was shaped. Primary data 
sources include interviews with Danish telecom experts. These interviews were used to 
verify data from secondary sources. That is why it is not included in this paper. Based on 
data gathered on the liberalization of the FTTH market in each of the countries, the 
penetration and subscription outcomes, a Strength, Weakness, Opportunity and Threat 
analysis of the OPPs was conducted. Thematic coding and narrative analyses were used 
as a support to identify themes that make up the SWOT analysis. The wordings used in 
the SWOT analysis are not the themes but explanation of the themes. The narrative 
analysis was used to piece together the stories about each country’s FTTH market.
Findings/Analysis
The Netherlands’ FTTH market
In the Netherlands, FTTH development began about 2008 (De Bijl, 2011). The national 
regulator OPTA enforced access regulation at the service layer while competition was 
regulated at the passive and access layer (Sadowski et al., 2006). This was done by 
ensuring local access (unbundling) via the open access principle (Sadowski et al., 2006; 
Godlovitch et al., 2015). To ensure the adoption of the open access principle, price caps 
for local access were enforced by the regulator OPTA (Van Gorp, Middleton, 2010). 
Reggefiber is the major wholesale supplier of wholesale Broadband in the Netherlands 
(Van Gorp, Middleton, 2010).
The open access policy served as an overarching OPP towards facilitating FTTH in 
the Netherlands. It outlined the procedure for providing the provision of access by an 
existing operator to a competing operator that has no infrastructure in the area. Based on 
this OPP, collaborations between the municipality, region, private sector, utility 
companies and cooperatives were designed to facilitate infrastructure development using 
the open access principle. However, the incentive for infrastructure owners to adopt 
open access principles is higher if they can earn substantial revenue from the practice. 
In a situation where open access is not beneficial to the infrastructure owner, the incentive 
to provide open access is lower. In this scenario, infrastructure providers are more 
inclined to adopt discriminatory pricing regimes to earn return on investment (RoI). 
They are also inclined to deny access to competing infrastructure providers based on 
their own discretion. The adoption of open access policies solves this problems. However, 
it is important to note that non-discrimination policies have always been a feature in 
regulating competition in the Netherlands (see OECD, 1998). Based on these measures to 
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ensure transparency and non-discrimination to the access infrastructure, players that 
were not previous actors in the market can now participate in facilitating FTTH.
In order to encourage open access and facilitate competition in the access and retail 
layer in areas that are not commercially viable, the regions and municipalities engage in 
co-investment activities with housing companies, cooperatives and private network 
operators towards developing the infrastructure. The co-investments from the public 
sector include subsidy to the private sector for the project (Sadowski et al., 2009; Kramer 
et al., 2006). This way, the network operator does not bear the cost of facilitating the 
infrastructure by themselves. This act increases the desire for the network operator to 
open access to other players to deploy at the service layer. Various initiatives depicting 
the aforementioned collaborations are represented in the table below. 
Table 1. PPP Frameworks in the Netherlands
Municipality/
Region Initiator
Initiated/
Started PPP Model
Network and service provision
network owner network provision
service 
provision
1. Almere municipality 2001 (2003) Coordination Municipality 
via AlmereFiber 
Company
First Mile 
Ventures
UNet (Until 
2008)
2. Amersfoort municipality 2005 (2006) Coordination BreedNet 
Amersfoort 
BreedNet 
Amersfoort
Casema
3. Amsterdam Municipality,  
PC (GNA)
2003 (2006) Coordination Glasvezelnet 
Amsterdam C.V 
BBned Variety 
of service 
providers
4. Arnhem SHC (Portaal)/ 
PC (GNEM) 
2006 (2007) Social Housing 
Corporation 
GNEM GNEM XMS
5. Deventer SHC (Rentree) 2004 (2006) Social Housing 
Corporation 
SHC Rentree 
Via Y3-net
SHC Rentree 
Via Y3-net
SHC Rentree 
Via Y3-net
6. Deventer PC (Reggefiber) 2007 (2007) Coordination  NEM Deventer NEM Deventer NEM Deventer
7. Eindhoven COOP (Onsnet 
Eindhoven)
2001 (2005) Cooperative OnsNet 
Eindhoven 
via NEM 
OnsNet 
Eindhoven 
via NEM 
Edutel
8. Enschede SHC 
(Woonplats&Domijin)
2003 (2005) Social Housing 
Corporation
Initially SHC 
via Casanet
Initially SHC 
via Casanet
KPN-Casanet
9. Helmond Municipality 2005 (2006) Franchise BBNed BBNed BBNed
10. Naaldwijk PC (CaiW) 2004 (2004) Franchise CaiW CaiW CaiW
11. Nuenen COOP 
(OnsnetNuenen) 
2001 (2005) Cooperative OnsNet 
Eindhoven 
via NEM 
OnsNet 
Eindhoven 
via NEM 
EDUTEL
12. Nijmegen 
– Hazenkamp
COOP (Glazenkamp) 2005 (2006) Cooperative GlazenKamp GlazenKamp  UCI-KUN 
(university)
13. Rotterdam Municipality 2002 (2006) Coordination Glasvezel 
Rotterdam 
via Bbned
Bbned Bbned
14 Utrecht COOP (Lomboxnet) 2002 (2004) Cooperative Lomboxnet Lomboxnet Lomboxnet
15. Utrecht 
– Leidsche Rijn
COOP (Kersentuin) 2003 (2004) Cooperative  Xs4all  Xs4all  Xs4all
PC – private company, COOP – cooperative, SHC – social housing corporation.
Source: adapted from Sadowski et al. (2009); original investigation by Stedenlink 2007, Stratix 2007.
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These co-investments arrangements are in the form of PPPs. The design of the PPPs, 
specifying the actors needed, the responsibilities of the actors and the incentives for the 
actors is another OPP. This OPP is not overarching as the open access policy. It is more 
specialized and localized to individual projects. The PPPs are aimed at providing 
financial and operational capacity to these hitherto disfranchised players in the FTTH 
market to become players in the market. As part of the co-investment initiatives, the 
municipality and regions provide subsidies to the cooperatives to help them facilitate the 
infrastructure (Van Gorp, Middleton, 2010). The financial burden is handled jointly by 
the municipalities, cooperatives and the private company.
Different PPP arrangements and business models have been crafted out of these 
collaborations as seen in the table above. Each row represents independent PPPs. The 
OPP for each PPP is represented in each row. The actors in each PPP and their roles and 
responsibilities are represented in each OPP. Here one can identify the dynamic roles of 
the municipalities and other government agencies. Their roles include owning the 
network outright. In other cases they own the network and lease it as a franchise. In other 
cases they coordinate the activities of the PPP. Another interesting player with a similar 
dynamic role are the housing corporations and cooperatives. One would say that they do 
not possess the financial might, the technical or managerial know how to facilitate FTTH 
infrastructure. However, they are players that cannot be ignored. This is because they are 
the demand stakeholders of these projects. Having them on board as active participants 
in the project enables them to know why they need the FTTH services. Being part of the 
deployment helps them understand that they can be a part of the retail infrastructure. On 
the other hand, the network provider either owns, manages or operates the infrastructure 
based on the design of the PPP. 
Despite this effort in extending FTTH to areas where there is market failure, the 
FTTH subscription in the Netherlands in 2015 was a little above 11% (FTTH Council 
Europe, 2015). It is not clear what impact the coop had on the overall penetration of 
FTTH in the Netherlands. Even though the cases mentioned here are not exhaustive. 
SWOT analysis on the market outcome from OPPs adopted in the Netherlands
Strengths: Some strengths can be identified in adoption the open access policy and 
PPPs by the Dutch government. In the Netherlands, the FTTH market is competitive at 
the service layer. There are also dynamic public, private and civil society collaborations 
towards delivering the FTTH infrastructure. Here different demand and supply 
stakeholders collaborate to facilitate FTTH delivery using PPPs. There is no discrimination 
of non-traditional network operators. Rather, they are empowered to aid the push in the 
delivery of FTTH. Though Reggefiber has been credited with the idea of involving 
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housing cooperation (Van Gorp, Middleton, 2010). This is because the company is owned 
by a real estate company, Reggeborgh. It owns 59% of Reggefiber (Indesteege, 2010). 
The company is involved in building and operating the passive infrastructure and 
operating the providing wholesale Broadband services as an active operator. 
Another strength is that Government agencies have not shied away from becoming 
actively involved and even investing in the PPPs. They have also made sure that PPPs are 
involved in facilitating open access at the service layer. The only difference between the 
open access principle in the Netherlands and in Sweden is that the access to the active 
and retail infrastructure is not on equal terms. In the Netherlands, a price cap is placed 
to avoid the broadband wholesaler from overcharging the retailer. This enables more 
operators to join the retail market to deliver the retail infrastructure. 
Weaknesses: The only clear weakness with the Dutch FTTH market is that there are 
few players in the wholesale market compared to the retail market. This is not a problem 
necessarily, but the most visible active player in the wholesale market is Reggefiber, 
a subsidiary of KPN. Reggefiber is seen as a dominant operator in the FTTH market 
(Marcus et al., 2009). This presents a scenario of a near monopoly at the wholesale 
market. 
Opportunities: This weakness creates room for further liberalizing the wholesale 
market. Facilitating more competition in the delivery of the passive and active 
infrastructure may change the dynamics of the market. This will hasten the penetration 
of FTTH, as there would be competition in business models, deployment scenarios and 
retail possibilities. Though the introduction of price caps is a good way of regulating 
prices, looking for ways of further liberalizing the wholesale market can also serve as 
a means of regulating prices. In addition to what other researchers may identify as the 
problem, identifying ways of attracting other major players to compete at the wholesale 
market should be considered by the Dutch government.
Threats: Though the OPPs have led to the emergence of a competitive FTTH market, 
there are other alternatives. These include mobile and fixed-Broadband and NGA 
networks. In the Netherlands LTE coverage in 2016, as an example, is more than 80% 
(Morris, 2016). Taking into consideration that LTE was rolled out long after FTTH was 
rolled out in the Netherlands. As mobile telephony evolves, end subscribers will wonder 
why they need FTTH anyway. But with respect to the market structure, the threat lies 
with the sustainability of initiatives managed by the housing cooperatives. It also lies 
with the potential of Reggefiber in the near future becoming a monopoly at the whole 
sale market. Probably more OPPs to facilitate competition is needed.
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Denmark’s FTTH market
The Danish case is different from that of the Netherlands. This is because Denmark 
adopts the regulatory approach towards FTTH development. In the political framework 
of 1999, the government agreed that the “best and cheapest” means to promoting 
universal service was to promote competition (ITU, 2002). However, public intervention 
was frowned upon. But, in January 2016, the government of Denmark did set up 
a Broadband fund of 300 million DKK for the course of 4 years to promote rural 
broadband coverage (Falch et al., 2016). One is yet to see what influence this initiative 
will have on the development of FTTH in rural areas in Denmark.
As this facilitation initiative is new, the focus on the analysis in this section will be 
on the previous competition regulation regime – which still exists. This competition 
regime serves as the overarching OPP of the Danish government towards the development 
of FTTH. It is important to note that Denmark is technology neutral and doing very well 
with regards to Broadband development. However, the focus of this paper is on the FTTH 
market, which incidentally is not doing so well.
Due to the competition policy in Denmark, there are no restrictions as to who can 
compete in the Danish telecoms market. As a result, the first entrants into the FTTH 
market in Denmark were utility (electricity) companies. The advantage the electricity 
companies had was the possibility of delivering FTTH using their powerline infrastructure 
(Falch et al., 2016). One of the first market entrants in 2002 was an electricity company 
called NVE (Pedersen, Riaz, 2009). In the same year, Dansk Bredband, an FTTH 
company began investing in Denmark. They were later sold to Waoo!, a network provider 
in 2010, due to financial losses (Berlingske Business, 2012). 
In 2009, some electricity companies began offloading their FTTH operations to 
become sole electricity providers (Pedersen, Riaz, 2009). It is important to note that 
some Danish utility companies are owned by their consumers and others are owned by 
municipalities. Later, the municipality owned utility companies had to be fully privatized. 
This is because the Danish government does not permit public intervention in the 
delivery of telecommunication infrastructure and services (Williams, 2015).
By 2009 utility companies such as Dong energy, EnergiMidt, TRE-For, sydEnergi 
and other were major players in the market (FTTH Council Europe, 2009). Dong energy 
only leased its active layer capacity to other market players to provide their Broadband 
Services. Dong had massive passive layer infrastructure providing coverage to the capital 
region of Denmark (Falch et al., 2016). By 2009, the activity of the actors under the 
guidance of the overarching OPP (competitive market) increased. The market share of 
the then active and retail players – existent then – is represented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. FTTH market share in 2009
Source: National..., 2009.
Within this period (by 2009), the utility companies had invested 5.5 billion DKK in 
the provision of FTTH infrastructure (National..., 2009). Based on the report from FTTH 
council Europe, in a research carried out by IDATE, 143,700 subscribers were registered 
between 2002 and 2009 (FTTH Council Europe, 2009). From 2009 onwards, market 
consolidations became evident. A market with multiple players was gradually 
consolidating via horizontal integrations. The biggest consolidation was that of Waoo! 
and the smallest consolidation was that of Stofa.
Before Waoo! emerged, there was an initial horizontal integration in Juteland. That 
was the consolidation of Bredband Nord. Bredband Nord underwent its own consolidation 
to gain competitive advantage before joining the Waoo! Consortium. Bredband Nord’s 
story begins with the horizontal integration of three local energy companies – ESV, ENV 
and Nyfors – to form Bredband Nord. Later, a fiber optic development company HEF 
Fibernet merged with Bredband Nord in 2013 to aid the expansion of its service in 
Northern Jutland (Bredbånd Nord, 2016). 
In 2010 Bredband Nord merged with 12 of Denmark’s largest companies to form 
Waoo! (FTTH Council Europe, 2011). These companies were: Sydfyns El, Energimidt, 
Tre-for, Nyfors, SydEnergi, SEA-NVE, Østjysk Energy, Verdo, NRGi, Energi Fyn, HEF 
Broadband, Galten Elværk, Northern Energy and Bredbandnord. Dansk Bredband was 
acquired later. This horizontal integration was branded as a marketing and product house 
for these energy companies (FTTH Council Europe, 2011). Hence they become not only 
an active market players but also service (retail) providers. This move was seen by 
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watchers of the market as means towards creating competition for TDC – a passive, 
active and retail provider – who bought Dong energy’s North and eastern Jutland Fiber 
network in the previous year (BreInstrup, 2012). Today these two companies dominate 
the Danish FTTH market. But TDC has greater edge based on the extent of its fiber optic 
backbone infrastructure in the country. 
The competition policy as an OPP enabled different actors to align based on interest 
to fulfill the government’s desire (universal service of Broadband). But the downside of 
the OPP was that it produced an environment that depicts the survival of the fittest. This 
strategy has not harmed the market per-se as it rather encourages innovation. However, 
it does not lead to a perfect competition. Neither is it leading towards the Universal 
Access of FTTH in the next three years. This is based on the market outlook based on the 
penetration of FTTH in the country. In 2015 the penetration of FTTH in Denmark was 
almost 15% and the FTTH subscription was 14.5% (FTTH Council Europe, 2015).
SWOT analysis on the market outcome from OPPs adopted in Denmark
Strength: The adoption of the competition policy in the Danish FTTH market has its 
strengths. TDC and Waoo! are able to harness economics of scale to develop the FTTH 
infrastructure in areas they operate. Though TDC has a much greater coverage than 
Waoo! they are also able to harness the economics of scope in the delivery of their 
services in areas they operate. The competition policy is not stifling. Just as in the 
Netherlands, competition is greater in the active and service layer than at the passive 
layer. This has resulted in innovation in service delivery and competitive pricing of the 
service (FTTH Council Europe, 2011). Another strength is the entrance of non-traditional 
network operators into the market. Here utility companies and coops are major players in 
this market. One would say that cooperatives are also indirect but inconsequential 
decision-making players, as they own some of the small utility companies. 
Opportunities: The opportunity for FTTH lies in the lowering of the market entry 
barriers at the active layer by encouraging the open access model. Infrastructure sharing 
at the passive layer coupled with open access policy at the active layer may encourage 
more competition as seen in Sweden and the Netherlands. This lesson may be useful to 
other EU countries as well, based on regulatory experiences from Sweden, France the 
Netherlands and the UK (See Godlovitch et al., 2015). Though the Danish state is joining 
the foray of providing financial incentives for Broadband development, adopting more 
innovative ways of liberalizing the FTTH access network delivery would aid the useful 
utilization of the financial incentives.
Weaknesses: The greatest weakness of the Danish market is also at the wholesale 
market. It is difficult to declare that competition exists here, when TDC controls this 
market. Other players in the Waoo! consortium are small and serve localized or smaller 
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areas compared to TDC. TDC does not have the incentive to expand its infrastructure 
(See Kildebogaard, 2012). The same is applicable to Dong. TDC is a conglomerate that 
also supplies other NGAs such as cable and vDSL. Dong energy is focused on its core 
activity of delivering energy. Therefore, the growth of FTTH in Denmark is not as rapid 
as the growth of other Broadband networks. One would say that the competition policy 
as an OPP is not an advantage to the FTTH market in Denmark. Though there were 
attempts to consolidate in order to deliver the infrastructure at the wholesale market, 
Waoo! in some cases needs to interconnect with TDC in some part of the country to 
extend their infrastructure and deliver their services. And there is the problem of 
connecting some rural areas.
Threat: The threat with the OPP is competition from substitute NGA’s, LTE and 5G 
development. Operators of FTTH have diversified their operations and the shift is 
towards the competition at the service layer. This occurs in urban areas and areas where 
housing cooperation could facilitate connectivity to boost the value of their houses. In 
rural areas, where there is no incentive to deploy the infrastructure and service, FTTH 
providers rarely provide their services there. There is the need for a review in the 
competition policy to facilitate ways and means (New OPPs) on how to make FTTH 
attractive in the presence of competing technologies in both urban and rural areas.
Sweden’s FTTH Market
Sweden was one of the first countries to deploy FTTH in Europe (FTTH Council 
Europe, 2015). In 1998, 138 municipalities owned fiber optic networks in Sweden 
(Orbion, 2016). This may explain why FTTB penetration is greater than the FTTH 
penetration as mentioned in the introduction. The Swedish approach to FTTH facilitation 
is similar to that of the Netherlands as they also regulate competition of FTTH at service 
level (Godlovitch et al., 2015). But it is different from the Netherlands because the Swedes 
regulate access via infrastructure sharing at the access level. At the passive layer, the 
national infrastructure is operator neutral (Orbion, 2016). So it is safe to say that the 
Swedish OPP is also that of the open access “On equal terms” policy. The difference 
between the Swedish approach and the Dutch approach is the conscious effort to ensure 
that the open access model goes high up to the passive level. There is also the difference 
between the two countries with respect to granting open access on equal terms.
Competition is regulated at the access level by granting open access on equal terms 
to service providers to compete both in infrastructure and service delivery (Ahl, 2013). 
This public initiative promotes competition at the service level by lowering the market 
entry barrier and doing away with discriminatory practices by the infrastructure owner. 
This enables more FTTH infrastructure suppliers to deliver their infrastructure in areas 
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that are not served. As a result different FTTH infrastructure and service providers 
supply Broadband Internet infrastructure and services in different areas of Sweden. 
An example of the adoption of the open access model is the case of Stokab AB. They 
provide FTTH in Stockholm. 100 network and service providers operate on their network 
(Forzati, Mattsson, 2015). The advantage of the Open access on equal terms is that the 
policy also enabled Broadband service providers the opportunity to access a wider 
market than just the urban market. 
Though the open access model is promoted at the access level, the policy of adopting 
shared access has been of great benefit at the wholesale and retail markets in Sweden 
(EC, 2010). This has resulted in lowering the market entry barrier at the wholesale 
market. It has resulted in the promotion of competition in the delivery of the fiber optic 
infrastructure at the National and municipal level. However, the horizontal and vertical 
integration as evident in Denmark is also evident in Sweden but at city or municipal 
levels (Forzati, Mattsson, 2015). For example, in Stockholm the remaining major FTTH 
wholesale infrastructure providers are Stokab and TeliaSonera. 
To enable the competition at these wholesale and retail levels, the Swedish 
Government adopted market incentive mechanisms to facilitate FTTH delivery. National 
subsidies were provided for the building of national fiber optic backbones and Municipal 
Area Networks (Lindskog, Johansson, 2005). These incentives provides the possibility 
for municipalities to encourage local communities – and in some cases old church 
parishes to – build their networks by forming cooperatives (Williams, 2015). In the urban 
areas, the municipalities mobilized housing companies and other cooperatives to 
facilitate FTTH (Forzati, Mattsson, 2015). Some of these municipality initiatives are 
PPPs, just as in the case of the Netherlands (Williams, 2015). They are also similar to that 
of the Netherlands in their PPP arrangements. Hence one would say that in some cases 
project specific PPPs acted as OPPs for the delivery of FTTH. In some of these PPP 
arrangements, public sector financing via subsidies to the coops and housing cooperatives 
are provided via EU funding channelled via the regional council and from the 
municipalities (Lindskog, Johansson, 2005; Williams, 2015). Coops are encouraged to 
facilitate, own and maintain service infrastructure, while the private sector competes in 
the delivery of services. The municipality either outsources the building of the 
infrastructure to the private sector or owns access infrastructure. The PPP arrangements 
differ as municipalities are permitted to design the PPP as well as design the infrastructure 
(Williams, 2015). 
Hence one would say that there is a great deal of similarity between the Dutch and 
Swedish approach. But the Swedish approach has resulted in greater results with 35.2% 
FTTH penetration with greater rural coverage among the three cases (FTTH Council, 
2016).
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SWOT analysis on the market outcome from OPPs adopted in Denmark
Strength: The adoption of the open access model as an OPP has produced some 
strengths in the market. The Swedish market is very competitive both in the delivery of 
passive, active and retail services. This is as a result of the conducive environment 
created via access regulation as well as providing developmental incentives for the 
operators. The regulatory incentives include, open access on equal terms (unbundled 
local access). This regulatory move removes access discrimination in the SLU agreements 
between the infrastructure owner and the competing access operators. The developmental 
incentive includes the provision of subsidies at the regional, national and regional levels, 
to FTTH. This has led to the lowering of market entry barriers at the access level, aiding 
the expansion of the FTTH infrastructure to homes. 
However, as a complementary action to the existing competition, the Swedish 
Government has adopted PPPs and other interventions for areas that are not commercially 
viable. Here they have encouraged non-traditional network operators to join and compete 
in the market as infrastructure owners. The design of PPPs has been a way of not just 
providing the FTTH infrastructure and services but also establishing and training 
non-traditional operators. This created demand opportunities for FTTH penetration into 
rural areas (Orbion, 2016).
For the private sector service infrastructure participants involved, the market exit 
cost is low, as they can decide to halt delivery of their services in one location and 
provide it at another location at the retail level. In a highly competitive market this 
fluidity in shifting operations to areas that are profitable is necessary. This is because 
another operator will fill the vacuum created by the former operator. And the former 
operator may find an opportunity to invest in virgin areas with similar OPPs operating 
there.
The overall strength in this approach is the political will and the active involvement 
of the Swedish Government to develop FTTH. Though they promote a competitive 
market, they have adopted a proactive measure by also becoming market players to 
extend the open access initiative to areas where there were market failures.
Weakness: Though the Swedish case seems successful, there is a mismatch between 
the actual number of connections and subscriptions. The reasons include the connections to:
1. Summer houses, whose access to connectivity is permanent but service 
subscriptions are temporal.
2. Connectivity to housing companies. Here there are possibilities of providing 
connectivity to buildings whose tenants may not subscribe to FTTH.
Another weakness is the horizontal integration of providers providing municipality 
fiber networks. In Stockholm, as mentioned earlier, the vertical integration has resulted 
in a duopoly (Forzati, Mattsson, 2015). Though competitive open access agreements will 
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ensure competition, the possibility of duopolies or oligopolies becoming prevalent is 
eminent if not checked. The duopolies are not widespread.
Opportunities: The Swedish approach to the facilitation of FTTH provides the 
opportunity for competition in service tariff, and competition in the nature of FTTH 
services delivered. Currently there are service platforms in Sweden that provide bundled 
services to end users. Here end users can decide to do away with a subscription they are 
not satisfied with. But there is room for more innovations in service delivery. 
Threats: The threat to the Swedish FTTH market is the sustenance of the 
infrastructure in rural areas in the face of low demand. Sweden is a high income earning 
nation, but keeping the demand for the service alive in rural areas is beyond the ability 
to pay for the service. It also relies on the usefulness of the service to the user (Williams, 
2015). The next threat may be the operational cost by housing corporations in paying 
access fees for unoccupied houses. Though this is less likely to happen in most urban 
areas of Sweden due to the high demand for housing, it is a threat that may occur at any 
point in time. 
Discussion
The Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden are at the forefront of FTTH development in 
the EU. The challenge identified in Sweden is low demand for FTTH in rural areas. 
In the Netherlands and in Denmark the challenge is on the limited competition at the 
wholesale market. Assuming there were more Reggefibers in the Netherlands, it is likely 
that there will be a greater FTTH penetration than there is at the moment. In Denmark, 
the absence of regulatory measures to ensure the Universal Access of FTTH has resulted 
in fewer players in the wholesale market.
However, based on the comparisons made in the previous section, one can identify 
that the Swedish FTTH market is competitive at the passive, active and retail level. 
The Swedish Government has provided policy incentives to aid the facilitation of each 
NGA market. Therefore, unlike in the Danish case, FTTH is not identified as “one of the 
technologies that will provide 30 Mbps to the end user”. Investments are also made by 
the Swedish Government to promote competition by adopting regulatory and development 
measures that will aid in the liberalization of the FTTH market at the wholesale and retail 
markets. Room is also created for a plethora of demand and supply stakeholders to 
participate in the facilitation of the market. Market participants in Sweden include coops, 
housing cooperation, municipalities, utility companies and infrastructure specialists 
(Godlovitch et al., 2015; Falch et al., 2016). These are possible reasons why Sweden is 
ahead in the delivery of FTTH in Europe, lagging only behind Latvia and Lithuania. 
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The Dutch market is the next most competitive FTTH market among the cases 
studied in this paper. The competition at the wholesale market is less than that of Sweden. 
This is because there are fewer players in this market. The Netherlands telecom markets 
is highly competitive, with the presence of local and international brands. However, few 
players in the telecoms market are active players in the FTTH wholesale market in the 
Netherlands. The adoption of conscious regulatory efforts of promoting open access via 
infrastructure sharing at the passive layer may be the way to go. This will of course be 
rejected by the owners of the passive network. But if promoting public good is of 
paramount interest to the public sector, then such an initiative would not be a bad idea. 
However, in the situation where the public sector has the financial capacity to facilitate 
their own passive network to promote such infrastructure sharing arrangements, which 
could also be a solution. 
At the retail market, the situation is different. There is competition in the Dutch 
FTTH retail market as efforts have been made to lower market entry barriers via access 
regulation. What also makes the Dutch approach worthy of note are the PPPs involving 
housing cooperation and the Reggefiber business model. Though the Netherlands is a small 
country, it is a heavily populated one with respect to its landsize. Extending such PPPs 
coupled with an infrastructure sharing policy will facilitate a more liberalized wholesale 
market. This may have a positive impact on the service tariffs provided to the subscribers 
on the long run.
The Danish FTTH market is less competitive of the three due to vertical and 
horizontal integrations as explained earlier. But it is a market that has a variety of actors 
as mentioned earlier. What Denmark needs is a dedicated attention to the FTTH market. 
Here there is the need to provide incentives for market players that are dedicated to 
facilitating FTTH. This will require the lowering of market entry barriers to the few 
areas where there is lack of infrastructure. In areas where there is an existing passive 
network, TDC and Dong energy should be mandated to share their infrastructure with 
competitors who are willing to deliver wholesale services to an area that is not served. 
This is cheaper than having new entrants set up their infrastructure. At the moment, 
TDC does not have that incentive to do so, hence some regulation is needed. If Denmark 
were to adopt access regulations to enable competition at the wholesale market, it is 
likely that it would be one of the fastest growing FTTH markets in the EU. 
Based on the comparisons made for the three FTTH markets, facilitating competition 
at the wholesale market may be one of the solutions to a much more rapid development 
of the FTTH market in the EU. However, despite the challenges identified in these 
markets, there are lessons from these markets. There are four in number. There could be 
more. These lessons were extracted from strengths identified in the SWOT analysis. 
The four lessons are as follows:
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1. Their political agenda: The governments of the three cases studied had clear 
political agendas towards facilitating high speed Broadband Infrastructure. 
The Swedes and the Dutch had a more focused agenda towards FTTH, while the 
Denmark’s towards NGAs is technology neutral. However, the commonality in 
their agenda was the promotion of competition in their respective markets. For the 
Danes competition was a means of attaining Universal Access. In order to achieve 
this, their idea as mentioned earlier was to “find the cheapest means” of facilitating 
the telecom network (ITU, 2002). In Sweden, facilitating e-government and 
building an information society was their vision. Their idea has been to develop 
an infrastructure that will support governance and societal development 
(Regeringskansliet, 2014). In the Netherlands facilitating competition via 
liberalization was originally aimed at prohibiting cartels (OECD, 1998). These 
ideologies did affect the various approaches towards the liberalization of their 
FTTH markets. It also affects how the governments feel the market should be 
regulated.
2. Technology preferences for achieving the EU 2020 digital agenda: The uptake of 
30 Mbps of NGA networks by 2020 is a target that can be achieved by different 
NGA networks, such as VDSL and DOCSIS 3.0. On the other hand, these NGA 
networks are cheaper to deploy than FTTH. Hence in Denmark technology 
neutrality is adopted towards meeting this target. However, in Sweden and in the 
Netherlands, more effort is made to facilitate the FTTH market. This is because 
FTTH deliver much more data rates than other NGA networks. It serves as 
a onetime investment without having to upgrade it as technology changes. This 
brings up the question of what would one regard as the basic service and which 
NGA should be given priority to deliver such basic services – with respect to 
Universal Service policies?
3.  Expected Service delivery to the end user: Aside Denmark, the Netherlands and 
Swedish governments are greatly concerned in the regulation of the last mile 
access networks. This is to ensure that citizens have the possibility towards 
adopting not just mobile services but FTTH services as well. Hence both countries 
have adopted co-investment initiatives and access regulations to achieve this goal. 
Denmark on the other hand prefers a competitive approach among the different 
technologies in the market. One would say that this is so because the services 
delivered by vDSL and cable are capable of providing high quality Broadband 
services as well. Another issue could be that Denmark prefers to move slowly, 
taking into consideration the rapid evolution of technology and the size of its 
market. This is the thought of the researcher. Hence the demand pull approach is 
preferred to the supply push approach in Denmark. 
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4. Retail and wholesale access regulation: Aside Sweden, emphasis is not made in 
development of the wholesale markets in Denmark and the Netherlands. Rather 
the emphasis is placed in the development of the last mile network. To ensure 
affordable broadband service delivery, the Dutch and the Swedes have adopted 
a regulatory and developmental approach towards delivering the last mile. While 
the Danes adopt a more regulatory approach. 
Conclusion
The lessons learnt from each case are simultaneously complementary and diverse. 
These strengths have been the backbone to the current market picture of FTTH penetration 
in each country. In the EU and among the cases studied, solutions adopted here are 
practiced. Based on the research conducted to produce this paper, and as seen in the 
cases studied, the greater the liberalization of the backhaul market, the greater the FTTH 
penetration. At the service level, the market entry and exit barriers are low. But at the 
wholesale level, the market exit barrier is high due to the capital intensive nature of 
FTTH operations. In this paper, infrastructure sharing at the wholesale level has been 
proposed as a means of lowering the exit barrier and mitigating the extent of the risk 
incurred by the wholesale provider. If this occurs, there is the possibility of reduced 
interconnection charges for the service providers and reduced access fee for the 
subscriber. FTTH services may become competitive and the desire for the service might 
grow.
The paper also exposes the fact that FTTH is not a regulatory priority in some EU 
countries. This is reflected in the Danish case. This is not such a problem if the focus is 
on NGA networks. In such a case, why bother about FTTH. But in a situation, where it is 
glaring that FTTH is a more durable NGA network with respect to enhanced data rates, 
capacity and Quality of Service, it might be wise to consider its long term deployment. 
This will create the political will regulate the Universal Access for FTTH infrastructure 
delivery.
In conclusion, ways to accommodate more players in the market or further liberalizing 
the FTTH market should be considered by EU member states. 
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Abstract
The penetration of Fiber-to-the-Home (FTTH) in the EU is low. This is because deploying FTTH is capital 
intensive. The liberalization of the FTTH market in three EU countries is studied in this paper. The aim is to identify the 
challenges that affect the growth of FTTH in the EU. This is a qualitative study. The Actor Network Theory is used to 
study the Obligatory Passage Points (OPP) in these markets. SWOT analysis is used as analytical tools to identify the 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in these markets – with respect to the OPPs. Based on the outcome 
of the study, this paper concludes that competition at the wholesale market aspect of the FTTH market should be given 
more priority than competition at the retail section of the Fiber-to-the-Home market. This prioritization in regulating 
competition will enable greater market penetration of Fiber-to-the-Home infrastructure.
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